Diamond
Heights Homeowners Assn. v. National American Ins. Co. (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 563, 277 Cal.Rptr. 906
[No.
A046045. First Dist., Div. Three. Feb. 6, 1991.]
DIAMOND
HEIGHTS HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. NATIONAL AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
(Superior
Court of the City and County of San Francisco, No. 888628, Stuart R. Pollak, Judge.)
(Opinion
by Strankman, J., with Merrill, Acting P. J., and Chin, J., concurring.)
COUNSEL
Bickel
& Coleman, Branden E. Bickel and William H. Curtis for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Sedgwick,
Detert, Moran & Arnold, George E. Sayre, Graziella Walsh Coggan, Tarkington, O'Connor & O'Neill, David
H. Waters, Norman L. Chong, Acker, Kowalick & Whipple, Stephen Acker, Charissa Dorian and Derek S. Goulding
for Defendants and Respondents.
OPINION
STRANKMAN,
J.
I.
Overview
The
instant action follows the settlement of an underlying action filed by plaintiff and appellant Diamond Heights
Homeowners Association (Association), a California corporation, against Diamond Heights Associates (Diamond
Heights), the developer of a condominium project, and Alpha Land Company (Alpha), the general contractor, among
other defendants, seeking damages for construction defects and deficiencies in the condominium project. The
complaint stated causes of action for negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty. [227 Cal.App.3d
570]
The
parties ultimately entered into a settlement of the underlying litigation which provided for a stipulated
judgment in favor of Association and against Diamond Heights and Alpha in the amount of $2,671,000. The total
settlement included: (1) the stipulated judgment; (2) cash contributions by Diamond Heights and Alpha in the sum
of $1,607,781.82, representing the remaining limits of their insurance coverage under certain comprehensive
liability policies, and a cash contribution of the architect and two subcontractors in the sum of $100,000, for
a total cash payment of $1,707,781.82 in partial satisfaction of the judgment; and (3) an assignment of rights
of Diamond Heights and Alpha to Association against their noncontributing insurance carriers for the balance of
the judgment owing in the sum of $963,218.18. These noncontributing carriers were American Home Assurance
Company (American), a New York corporation; National American Insurance Company (National), a Nebraska
corporation; and Central National Insurance Company of Omaha (Central), a Nebraska corporation, the defendants
and respondents in the instant action.
Diamond
Heights and Alpha moved for an order confirming good faith settlement. (Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6.)
fn. 1 Central filed its objections thereto. Following a hearing, the trial court confirmed the
settlement as made in good faith and free from collusion.
Following
confirmation of the settlement, Association initiated this action against American, National, and Central to
satisfy the balance of the stipulated judgment. Each of these defendants had issued a policy of liability
insurance to Diamond Heights or Alpha. National had issued a "primary" general liability policy with a liability
coverage limit of $1 million. Central had issued an "umbrella" policy, including excess coverage (i.e., all
primary or underlying insurance must be exhausted before excess coverage becomes effective) with a $3 million
per occurrence limit. American had issued an umbrella policy with a $2.5 million per occurrence limit. Following
discovery, the three defendant insurance carriers moved for summary judgment/summary adjudication of issues. (§
437c.) American and National sought summary judgment on the ground of certain exclusionary provisions in their
policies. Central sought summary judgment on the ground of exclusionary provisions in its policy as well as its
contention that the stipulated judgment, which had been entered into without its consent, violated a specific
condition to coverage under the policy.
The
trial court granted summary judgment in favor of all three defendant insurance carriers. Association moved for
reconsideration as to the order [227 Cal.App.3d 571] granting summary judgment in favor of Central,
offering additional documentation and evidence. The trial court reconsidered but then confirmed its order
granting summary judgment.
[1]
In reviewing the orders granting summary judgment, we independently review whether the papers filed in support
of and in opposition to the motions for summary judgment show there were no triable issues of material fact,
such that the moving parties were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (AARTS Productions, Inc. v. Crocker
National Bank (1986)
179 Cal.App.3d 1061,
1064 [225 Cal.Rptr. 203].)
We
affirm the judgment in favor of National and American but reverse the judgment in favor of Central.
II.
Summary Judgment in Favor of National Was Proper
[2a]
A. Pertinent policy exclusions. National issued a comprehensive general liability policy to Diamond Heights and
Alpha which contained the following exclusionary provision:fn.
2 "This insurance does not apply: ... (1) to property damage to the named insured's products
arising out of such products or any part of such products; and ... (m) to property damage to work performed by
or on behalf of the named insured arising out of the work or any portion thereof, or out of materials, parts or
equipment furnished in connection therewith."
These
exclusions, referred to by the courts and commentators as the "work product" exclusion, constitute standard
exclusions in the standard form comprehensive general liability policy issued to a general contractor. (See
Western Employers Ins. Co. v. Arciero & Sons, Inc. (1983)
146 Cal.App.3d 1027,
1028 [194 Cal.Rptr. 688].) The exclusion precludes coverage for liability for damage to and deficiencies of the
insured contractor's work product. It applies to the insured's defective work as well as to the insured's
satisfactory work that is damaged by the insured's defective work. (Id., at p. 1029.) The exclusion is consistent
with the purpose of this type of policy which is neither a performance bond nor an all-risk policy. (Id., at p.
1031.) The coverage afforded by such policy is for tort liability for physical damage to others; for example,
liability for damage to an automobile caused by a falling wall defectively constructed by the insured. (Id., at p.
1032.) The coverage is not for liability for economic loss based on a product or [227 Cal.App.3d 572]
completed work which is not that for which the damaged person bargained. (Henderson, Insurance Protection for
Products Liability and Completed Operations - What Every Lawyer Should Know (1971) 50 Neb. L.Rev. 415, 441.)
The
Arciero court explained: "This makes sense from the standpoint of the insurer and the insured. By excluding
repair and replacement losses, the insurer gives the contractor an incentive to exercise care in workmanship
thereby reducing the risk that is covered: damage to property of third parties. Coverage of repair and
replacement costs would undermine this incentive. If the work failed the insurer would end up holding the scrap.
Excluding repair and replacement costs also reduces the cost of the policy. The insurer is freed from
administering frequent claims for minor repairs and can set its rate based on the less frequent but potentially
large claims for damage to the property of others." (Western Employers Ins. Co. v. Arciero & Sons, Inc.,
supra, 146 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1031-1032.)
B.
The work product exclusion precludes coverage for Association's claimed losses in the underlying action.
Association's underlying action was brought pursuant to section 374, which grants owners' associations a limited
right to bring actions on behalf of the individual owners, without joining the owners, to recover for damage to
(1) common areas, or (2) the separate interests which the association is obligated to maintain or repair, or (3)
the separate interests which arise out of damage to the common area.
Association's
complaint in the underlying action alleged damages resulting from the defendants' negligence and faulty
workmanship, as follows: "[D]efendants, and each of them, negligently and carelessly developed, designed,
constructed, supplied, installed and repaired the subsoil, foundations, buildings, component parts, and other
improvements to the project Common Area so as to cause the same to subside, crack, leak, deteriorate and fall
into disrepair ...." The damage was alleged as follows: "The subsidence, cracks, leaks and excessive
deterioration have required extensive repairs throughout the Diamond Heights Condominiums. As a consequence
plaintiff must retain consultants ... to advise it of the true nature and extent of ... any common defects in
the development, design and construction of the Diamond Heights Condominiums."
In
response to interrogatories propounded by defense counsel requesting an itemization of the damages claimed,
Association's counsel listed deficiencies in roofing, drainage system, siding, structural elements, electrical
system; as well as application of asbestos spray, water penetration, leaks, inadequate foundations, and wood
fungal decay. [227 Cal.App.3d 573]
The
foregoing itemized damages are covered by the plain language of the work product exclusion, in that all such
items comprise part of the work product of the developer and general contractor.
[3]
Association argues that consequential damages resulting from but not part of the contractor's work product are
not covered by the work product exclusion, citing Baugh Const. Co. v. Mission Ins. Co. (9th Cir. 1988) 836 F.2d
1164. In Baugh, the Ninth Circuit held consequential damages such as damage to tenant improvements resulting
from a contractor's faulty work are covered under a general liability policy, notwithstanding the work product
exclusion. (Id., at p. 1172.) Association identifies the consequential damages allegedly suffered here as health
hazards to individual owners, water damage to their personal property such as furniture and drapes, and
relocation expenses during repair work.
Here,
unlike the case in Baugh, the consequential damages specified by Association were neither pled in the complaint
nor identified in response to discovery requests. More significantly, under section 374, Association could not
seek such damages by its action because they did not constitute damage to either the common area or separate
interests in the condominium projects. Association therefore was precluded from seeking any consequential
damages not excluded from coverage under the work product exclusion.
[2b]
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the record supports the trial court's finding there were no triable
issues of material fact as to Association's claim for coverage under the National policy, and that such claim
was barred by the work product exclusion as a matter of law.
III.
Summary Judgment in Favor of American Was Proper
American
issued a liability policy to Alpha which contained the same work product exclusion as contained in the National
policy. As the trial court ruled, this exclusion precluded coverage under the American policy as a matter of law
for Association's claims for the same reasons the exclusion precluded coverage under the National policy.
IV.
Summary Judgment in Favor of Central Must Be Reversed
As
stated, Central's umbrella policy provided coverage for losses in excess of other valid and collectible primary
insurance. (See 39 Cal.Jur.3d, Insurance Contracts, § 500, p. 823.) The primary insurers undertook and paid all
costs of the defense of the underlying litigation through settlement. Although advised of the pendency of the
action and the settlement [227 Cal.App.3d 574] negotiations, Central did not participate actively in the
defense or the settlement of the action.
A.
Central's policy. Central's policy contained a work product exclusion similar to that contained in the National
and American policies. A "Contractor's Endorsement," however, made a part of the policy, appeared on its face to
nullify this exclusion by providing: "It is hereby agreed that the exclusion relating to property damage to work
performed by or on behalf of the insured arising out of the work or any portion thereof, or out of materials,
parts, or equipment furnished in connection therewith is deleted." (Italics added.)
Condition
G of the policy provided for notice of an occurrence for which the insured could be held liable to be sent to
Central as soon as practicable.
Condition
H of the policy provided as to any action instituted against the insured: "Assistance and Cooperation. [Central]
shall not be called upon to assume charge of the settlement or defense of any claim made or suit brought or
proceeding instituted against the Insured but [Central] shall have the right and shall be given the opportunity
to associate with the Insured or the Insured's underlying insurers, or both, in the defense and control of any
claim, suit or proceeding relative to an occurrence where the claim or suit involves, or appears reasonably
likely to involve [Central], in which event the Insured and [Central] shall cooperate in all things in the
defense of such claim, suit or proceeding."
Condition
J of the policy included the standard "no action" clause providing that the insured could make a claim of loss
"after the Insured's liability shall have been fixed and rendered certain either by final judgment against the
Insured after actual trial or by written agreement of the Insured, the claimant, and the Company [Central]."
(Italics added.)
B.
Central's response to underlying litigation. By letter dated March 13, 1987, the defense counsel retained by the
primary carriers notified Central of the pendency of the underlying litigation and that the plaintiffs' demand
exceeded primary coverage limits. Central responded that it would retain counsel to monitor the case and
evaluate the potential exposure to Central's coverage. In April 1987, defense counsel advised Central that
plaintiffs' most recent settlement demand was $3,351,853. By letter dated May 19, 1987, defense counsel advised
Central "that it is most likely that the primary policy limits will be exhausted" and requested an immediate
response as to whether or not there was any denial of coverage. [227 Cal.App.3d 575]
In
June 1987, counsel retained by Central requested copies of all pleadings, deposition summaries and other
discovery documentation, and status reports. On June 10, 1987, defense counsel met with Central's counsel to
review the status of and evaluate the case. By letter dated August 20, 1987, Central's counsel advised that it
was investigating the claim against Alpha but reserved all rights under the policy, and confirmed that as an
excess carrier it owed no present duty to defend.
In
November 1987, defense counsel advised Central's counsel that at a mandatory settlement conference, two primary
carriers had committed their policy limits in the total amount of $1.5 million in settlement of the action,
which offer, combined with $100,000 from other defendants, had been made to plaintiffs' counsel. He further
advised that plaintiffs' counsel informed them that his estimate of repair costs, exclusive of asbestos
abatement costs, exceeded $2 million and that asbestos abatement work would be costly. By letter dated November
5, 1987, defense counsel advised Central of plaintiffs' settlement demand of $2,671,064, and stated: "Since this
figure clearly exceeds the policy limits of St. Paul and Consolidated American, which limits have been 'put on
the table' (approximately $1,600,000), your immediate statement of position is required .... [¶] The trial
remains set for Monday, November 9, 1987." Central responded by offering to contribute $150,000 towards
settlement.
On
November 9, 1987, after the case was assigned to trial, the parties reached a settlement agreement in open
court. Counsel for Central was present and objected to the settlement at the time it was placed on the record.
As
stated previously, counsel then filed a motion for an order confirming good faith settlement pursuant to section
877.6. Central filed a notice of its objections and nonconsent to the settlement on the grounds that the amount
of the stipulated judgment was unreasonable and appeared to be the result of collusion between plaintiffs and
defendants. Following a hearing, the trial court confirmed the settlement as entered in good faith, and made the
following findings of fact: that the case presented a situation of clear liability on the part of Diamond
Heights, as developer, and Alpha, as general contractor, and the amount paid in settlement constituted a fair
representation of the potential recovery, in that various experts placed Association's damages between $1.2
million and $3.8 million; and there was no evidence of fraud or collusion.
Before
turning to Central's motion for summary judgment, we comment briefly on the nature of primary and excess
insurance coverage, as [227 Cal.App.3d 576] summarized in Transit Casualty Co. v. Spink Corp.
(1979)
94 Cal.App.3d 124 [156
Cal.Rptr. 360] (disapproved in part in Commercial Union Assurance Companies v. Safeway Stores, Inc. (1980)
26 Cal.3d 912 [164
Cal.Rptr. 709, 610 P.2d 1038]): "The policyholder pays for two kinds of liability coverage, each at a different
rate. The premium charged by the primary insurer supports more localized claims adjustment facilities than those of
the excess carrier. It takes into account costs of defense, including legal fees, which the primary insurer
normally provides. The excess carrier is less frequently confronted with loss possibilities and, when it is, may
employ local adjusters. The primary insurer is assisted, not impeded, by the active participation of another
carrier with a stake in the negotiations. Self-interest will impel the primary carrier to take the lead when
settlement value is well within its policy limits, the excess carrier when the claim invades its own policy
exposure. When settlement value hovers over the fringes of both policies, both carriers may collaborate." (Transit
Casualty Co., supra, at p. 135.)
C.
Central's motion for summary judgment. Central moved for summary judgment on the ground of the work product
exclusion, and on the alternate ground that the stipulated judgement entered without its consent violated
condition J of its policy, cited ante. Central argued that it had the right to object to the settlement, and its
lack of consent thereto barred Association's claim of loss under condition J. In support of this argument,
Central cited authority for the proposition that absent a demonstration of bad faith, a liability insurer acts
within its contract rights whenever it refuses to voluntarily settle a claim and insists on adjudication of the
matter on the merits. (See Clark v. Bellefonte Ins. Co. (1980)
113 Cal.App.3d 326,
337 [169 Cal.Rptr. 832].)
In
opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Association produced the "Contractor's Endorsement," which
appeared to nullify the work product exclusion. Association also argued that Central did not have the right to
object to the settlement where the trial court found it was made in good faith and free from fraud or collusion.
Association further argued that the evidence established Central had waived or was estopped to assert condition
J of the policy.
The
trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Central on the ground the settlement did not comply with
condition J, in that "Central was not obligated to consent to the settlement despite the fact that it was
entered with the court's assistance, and the defense of the action was never tendered to or rejected by
[Central]." In confirming the order granting summary judgment following reconsideration, the court stated: "When
the primary [227 Cal.App.3d 577] carriers agreed to pay their policy limits, plaintiff did not demand
that Central either approve the settlement or accept the defense of the action. Since Central objected to the
settlement but was not asked to assume the defense, there was no waiver or estoppel with respect to the
provisions of Condition J of the policy."
D.
Duty of primary and excess insurers to undertake defense; insurer's authority to settle and duty of good faith
in settling case. [4] Generally, the primary insurer alone owes a duty to provide and bear all costs of the
defense, with a corresponding right of control over the defense. The excess carrier has no right or duty to
participate in the defense, absent contract language to the contrary, until the primary policy limits are
exhausted. (Signal Companies, Inc. v. Harbor Ins. Co. (1980)
27 Cal.3d 359,
370-371 [165 Cal.Rptr. 799, 612 P.2d 889, 19 A.L.R.4th 75]; Continental Casualty Co. v. Royal Ins. Co.
(1990)
219 Cal.App.3d 111,
119 [268 Cal.Rptr. 193]; Continental Cas. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. (N.D.Cal. 1981) 516 F.Supp.
384, 387-388, 393.)fn.
3 fn.
4
Where
the excess policy contains language similar to condition H in Central's policy, the primary insurer ordinarily
remains responsible for the defense until final resolution of the litigation. Thus, even if the insured's
potential liability exceeds primary policy limits and invades excess coverage, and the primary insurer is
willing to pay to the excess insurer the primary policy limits, the primary insurer may not as a matter of right
tender the defense of the action to the excess insurer or otherwise relieve itself of the duty to defend.
(Chubb/Pacific Indemnity Group v. Insurance Co. of North America (1987)
188 Cal.App.3d 691,
698 [233 Cal.Rptr. 539]; see Continental Casualty Co. v. Royal Ins. Co., supra, 219 Cal.App.3d at p. 123.) The
primary insurer's duty to defend is not extinguished until settlement or payment of judgment. (Chubb/Pacific
Indemnity Group, supra, at p. 698.) In Chubb/Pacific, the excess insurance policy contained language similar to
condition H. The primary insurer, however, contended that by ceding its policy limits to the excess carrier it had
an equitable right to have [227 Cal.App.3d 578] the excess carrier assume the costs of defense. (188
Cal.App.3d at p. 696.) The court disagreed, stating: "Clearly, the respective policy premiums charged were
predicated on the respective obligations assumed by the carriers. If [primary insurer's] position were adopted, it
would mean that any primary insurer which contracted to provide a defense in addition to policy limits could walk
away from that obligation, whenever the insured had excess coverage, by simply acknowledging its separate
contractual duty, to pay policy limits upon settlement or judgment, a highly inequitable result." (Id., at pp.
698-699, fn. omitted.)
[5]
As stated, the primary insurer has control over the defense which arises from its duty to defend. (See generally
7C Appleman, op. cit. supra, § 4681, pp. 3-4.) The right of control extends to all aspects of the defense,
including the negotiation of any settlement prior to trial. (Continental Cas. Co. v. United States Fid. &
Guar. Co., supra, 516 F.Supp. at p. 392; Continental Casualty Co. v. Royal Ins. Co., supra, 219 Cal.App.3d at p.
119.) The excess insurer has no right to step in and try to settle the case (ibid.), unless perhaps it has
exercised its option under a provision such as condition H to associate with the primary insurer in the defense.
[6]
Any insurer, whether excess or primary, in conducting settlement negotiations, is subject to an implied duty of
good faith and fair dealing which requires it to consider the interests of the insured equally with its own and
evaluate settlement proposals as though it alone carried the entire risk of loss. (Johansen v. California State
Auto. Assn. Inter- Ins. Bureau (1975)
15 Cal.3d 9, 16
[123 Cal.Rptr. 288, 538 P.2d 744]; Travelers Ins. Co. v. Lesher (1986)
187 Cal.App.3d 169,
188 [231 Cal.Rptr. 791]; Merritt v. Reserve Ins. Co. (1973)
34 Cal.App.3d 858,
873 [110 Cal.Rptr. 511].) Such duty carries with it an obligation to conduct good faith settlement negotiations
sufficient to ascertain the most favorable terms available and make an informed evaluation of any settlement
demand. (Garner v. American Mut. Liability Ins. Co. (1973)
31 Cal.App.3d 843,
847-848 [107 Cal.Rptr. 604]; Continental Cas. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., supra, 516 F.Supp. at p.
389.)
[7]
The duty of good faith and fair dealing in an insurance policy "is a two-way street," running from the insured
to his or her insurer as well as vice versa. (Commercial Union Assurance Companies v. Safeway Stores, Inc.
(1980)
26 Cal.3d 912,
918 [164 Cal.Rptr. 709, 610 P.2d 1038], citing with approval Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Altfillisch Constr. Co.
(1977)
70 Cal.App.3d 789,
797 [139 Cal.Rptr. 91].) Thus, in evaluating settlement of a claim where the insured and insurer may both incur
liability, each assumes an obligation to act in good faith, to face the facts realistically, and to [227
Cal.App.3d 579] maintain a mutual respect for the interests of the other. (7C Appleman, op. cit. supra (1990
pocket pt.) § 4712, p. 70.)
[8]
Where there is excess coverage, the excess carrier, under the doctrine of equitable subrogation, may be
subrogated to the position of the insured vis-...-vis the primary insurer's duty of good faith. The primary
insurer accordingly owes a duty of good faith to the excess carrier which is identical to that owed to its
insured. (Commercial Union Assurance Companies v. Safeway Stores, Inc., supra, 26 Cal.3d at pp. 917-918; see
Signal Companies, Inc. v. Harbor Ins. Co., supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 365.) It must consider in good faith the
interests of the excess insurer equally with its own (Continental Cas. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar.
Co., supra, 516 F.Supp. at p. 387), and must conduct the defense of the litigation, including settlement
negotiations, so as not to expose the excess insurer to unwarranted liabilities. (Knepper, Relationships Between
Primary and Excess Carriers in Cases Where Judgment or Settlement Value Will Exhaust the Primary Coverage (1953)
20 Ins. Counsel J. 207 (hereafter Knepper); Lanzone, Resolving Conflicts Between Primary and Excess Insurers
(1975) 635 Ins. L.J. 733 (hereafter Lanzone).) An excess insurer may therefore recover against the primary
insurer when, for example, the latter wrongfully refuses to accept a settlement offer within primary policy
limits, where, prior to trial, there was a substantial likelihood of recovery in excess of those limits.
(Commercial Union, supra, at p. 917; Continental Casualty Co. v. Royal Ins. Co., supra, 219 Cal.App.3d at p.
117; Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farmers' Ins. Group (1978)
76 Cal.App.3d 1031,
1050 [143 Cal.Rptr. 415]; see generally, Lanzone, op. cit. supra, at p. 737.)
F.
Issues and discussion. [9] We first turn to the trial court's stated basis for granting summary judgment in
favor of Central, i.e., the insured's claim against Central was barred by reason of its failure to demand that
Central undertake the defense of the action prior to entering into the settlement. We find such reasoning
inconsistent with established law discussed ante, and the uncontroverted pertinent facts. The primary carriers,
acting on behalf of their insureds, were neither obligated nor entitled to make a formal demand upon Central to
undertake the defense before proceeding to settle the case. Under the express language of condition H, as
construed by Chubb/Pacific, the primary carriers were precluded from tendering responsibility for the defense
prior to settlement or final judgment.
Central,
as the beneficiary of condition H, had the right to waive its provisions and consent to take over the defense
from the primary insurers and continue the proceeding instead of settling. (See Knepper, op. cit. supra, 20 Ins.
Counsel J. at p. 208.) The record indicates that Central was afforded [227 Cal.App.3d 580] every
opportunity of doing so up through the time of settlement. There is no showing it ever availed itself of this
opportunity, or made any overture whatsoever to the primary insurers' counsel to assume the defense. The record
shows, at the least, that there is a triable issue of fact as to whether Central was afforded a reasonable
opportunity of undertaking the defense in order to avoid settlement.
[10a]
Having concluded the trial court's stated reasons do not support its ruling in favor of Central, we turn to the
issues which we find are dispositive of the appeal: Were the primary insurers entitled to settle the case for an
amount which invaded excess coverage without the excess insurer's consent? Conversely, did the excess insurer
have the absolute right under condition J to object to and therefore preclude any settlement which invaded
excess coverage, even if reasonable and made in good faith, thereby compelling the primary insurer to continue
the litigation and provide a defense through trial? We find these questions are of first impression under
California law.
We
conclude a primary insurer may negotiate a good faith settlement of a claim in an amount which invades excess
coverage, and that the primary insurer may enter into such settlement binding upon the excess insurer without
the excess insurer's consent, notwithstanding the "no action" clause under condition J, subject to certain
conditions. The legal basis and policy considerations which support our conclusion are set forth below.
[11]
As discussed ante, under the doctrine of equitable subrogation, the excess insurer may assume the rights of the
insured vis- -vis the primary insurer incident to the settlement of a claim. Correspondingly, under the same
doctrine, the excess insurer should assume the insured's obligations owing to the primary insurer. (See
Valentine v. Aetna Ins. Co. (9th Cir. 1977) 564 F.2d 292, 297.) One of these obligations, as discussed ante, is
where a claim is made against an insured which may exceed policy limits; in such case the insured as well as the
insurer must evaluate settlement options in good faith, realistically, and with a mutual respect for the
interests of the other. (7C Appleman, op. cit. supra, § 4712, p. 70.) Thus, the excess insurer, in evaluating
the reasonableness of a settlement negotiated by the primary insurer, must consider whether the settlement bears
a reasonable relation to the potential for liability and maximum likely recovery if the case proceeds to trial,
and, in addition, the costs of defense and burdens imposed upon all parties if the litigation continues.
Consistent with its good faith duty, the excess insurer does not have the absolute right to veto arbitrarily a
reasonable settlement and force the primary insurer to proceed to trial, bearing the full costs of defense. A
contrary rule would impose the same unnecessary [227 Cal.App.3d 581] burdens upon the primary insurer and
the parties to the action, among others, as does the primary insurer's breach of its good faith duty to settle:
" '... [I]t imperils the public and judicial interests in fair and reasonable settlement of lawsuits ....' "
(Valentine v. Aetna Ins. Co., supra, 564 F.2d at p. 297; see Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farmers' Ins. Group,
supra, 76 Cal.App.3d at p. 1045.)
[10b]
Although such holding is in apparent conflict with the "no action" clause of condition J, we conclude the excess
insurer may waive its rights under that clause if it rejects a reasonable settlement and at the same time fails
to offer to undertake the defense. [12] In a somewhat analogous situation, when a primary insurer wrongfully
denies coverage, unreasonably delays processing a claim, or refuses to defend an action against the insured as
required by the policy, the insured is entitled to make a reasonable settlement of the claim in good faith and
then sue for reimbursement, even though the policy prohibits settlements without the consent of the insurer.
(Phoenix Ins. Co. v. United States Fire Ins. Co. (1987)
189 Cal.App.3d 1511,
1526 [235 Cal.Rptr. 185]; Northwestern Title Security Co. v. Flack (1970)
6 Cal.App.3d 134,
146 [85 Cal.Rptr. 693].) The insurer is deemed to have waived its rights under the " 'no action' " clause by such
conduct constituting a breach of its obligations under the policy. (7C Appleman, op. cit. supra, § 4714, pp.
526-530.) In Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Security Ins. Co. (1976) 72 N.J. 63 [367 A.2d 864], the court held that
where the liability insurer fails to make an honest and intelligent evaluation of a case for settlement purposes
and fails to consider a reasonable offer to settle for an amount in excess of its policy limits, it breaches the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The insured then is free, despite a no action clause, to minimize
potential liability and agree to a reasonable settlement and then seek reimbursement from the insurer. The court
stated that "[w]hile the right to control settlements reserved to insurers is an important and significant
provision of the policy contract [citations], it is a right which an insurer forfeits when it violates its own
contractual obligation to the insured." (Id., at p. 868.)
Central
argued below that where, as here, the potential liability does not exceed excess policy limits ($3.8 million
estimated maximum potential liability and $4.5 million combined primary and excess coverage), the excess insurer
should have the absolute right to object to the settlement. Central cited the rule that where maximum potential
loss does not exceed liability policy limits, the insurer has the absolute right to control the litigation and
[227 Cal.App.3d 582] settlement, because the insured is not subjected to any risk of loss. (See 7C
Appleman, op. cit. supra, § 4711, pp. 368-369.)fn.
5
We
find this argument unpersuasive. In a case where probable liability far exceeds primary policy limits and
invades excess limits, the excess insurer, if given the authority, might object to reasonable settlements simply
because all costs of litigation would be borne by the primary insurer, and the amount of potential liability if
the case proceeded to trial might not be substantially greater than the amount to be paid in settlement. The
excess insurer would get a "free ride" at the expense of the primary insurer to the detriment of all other
parties involved.
[13]
The excess insurer is not without a means of avoiding a proposed settlement or challenging a final settlement.
First, as stated, it may voluntarily waive policy provisions such as condition H and agree to undertake the
defense (once the primary insurer tenders its full policy limits) and either conduct its own settlement
negotiations or take the action to trial. It may also challenge the settlement on the ground of unreasonableness
or that it is a product of collusion between primary insurer and insured.fn.
6
An
appropriate time for the insurer to present objections to the settlement is, as occurred in the instant case, at
the good faith confirmation hearing pursuant to section 877.6, if there is one. If the excess insurer asserts
the right to object, and is accorded due process in presenting its objections to the settlement, and the trial
court confirms the settlement as made in good faith, the excess insurer stands in the position of a "co-obligor"
barred from making a claim of bad faith against the settling parties. (§ 877.6, subd. (c).) The excess insurer's
remedy, if aggrieved by the good faith confirmation, is to petition the court for writ of mandate. (§ 877.6,
subd. (e).)
In
the instant case, Central asserted the right to object to the settlement, and did put its objections on the
record. All parties, including Central, had [227 Cal.App.3d 583] the opportunity to participate at the
section 877.6 hearing, present evidence and arguments, and fully litigate the issues of good faith and
reasonableness. Thereafter, Central, as an aggrieved party, failed to avail itself of the right to challenge the
confirmation order by petitioning for writ of mandate. Central's claims of bad faith and collusion in the
instant action are therefore barred as a matter of law under section 877.6. They are also barred under
principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel, where Central had an identity of at least certain interests
with its insured, and had the opportunity to present its objections to the settlement in protection of its own
interests. (See generally, 7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Judgment, §§ 193, pp. 627-628, 283, p. 721,
287, pp. 723-724.)
We
conclude, under the foregoing analysis, that Central did not establish as a matter of law that the primary
insurers were required to tender a formal demand that Central undertake the defense before entering into the
settlement. The record further shows Central's papers filed in support of summary judgment did not dispose of
the material factual issue of whether Central waived its rights under condition J, including the issue of
whether Central was afforded a reasonable opportunity to undertake the defense prior to the settlement. The
trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of Central on the grounds the primary insurers did not tender
the defense to Central before settling, and that the settlement did not comply with condition J, therefore
constituted error. Summary judgment should have been denied.
Our
ruling does not affect the issue raised below of the effect of the work product exclusion and the contractor's
endorsement on Association's claim of coverage.
V.
Disposition
The
judgments in favor of American and National are affirmed. The judgment in favor of Central is reversed. American
and National to recover their costs on appeal against Association. Association to recover costs on appeal
allocable to appeal from judgment in favor of Central against Central.
Merrill,
Acting P. J., and Chin, J., concurred.
FN 1. All
further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless indicated otherwise.
FN 2. In
support of its motion for summary judgment, National relied on a "premises alienated" exclusion as well as the work
product exclusions. Because we find the work product exclusions alone bar Association's claim for coverage as a
matter of law, we need not and therefore do not address the premises alienated exclusion.
FN 3. "The
duty of the primary insurer is not divisible or limited to those suits that are within the policy limits and the
insuring agreement creates a duty to defend any suit regardless of the amount claimed against the insured and the
excess insurer is a third party beneficiary of that agreement." (7C Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice (Berdal
ed. 1979) § 4682, p. 28.)
FN 4. In
Signal Companies, Inc. v. Harbor Ins. Co., supra,
27 Cal.3d 359,
the court stated an excess carrier might in a given case be required to contribute to the continuing costs of
defense after the primary coverage limits are exhausted. (Id., at pp. 370-371.)
In
Johnson v. Continental Ins. Companies (1988)
202 Cal.App.3d 477,
481-486 [248 Cal.Rptr. 412], the court found the insurer's duty to defend never arose when it tendered its policy
limits in response to the insured's demand that it do so before the initiation of any litigation.
FN 5. In
its supplemental letter briefing, Central concedes that it has no absolute right to veto a reasonable settlement.
FN 6. For
example, in a Minnesota personal injury case, the trial court entered a directed verdict on very tenuous grounds
against the defendant insured and other defendants, which was reduced to a judgment. Because the trial court failed
to rule on posttrial motions, there was no opportunity to appeal from the judgment. The insured then dismissed its
insurer's counsel and proceeded to enter into a settlement, without the consent of the insurer, whereby he would
pay nothing and his insurer was obligated to pay the full amount of the judgment. The insurer refused to pay and
filed an action challenging the settlement. The court held that where the validity of the underlying judgment was
questionable on its face, and the settlement did not reflect a reasonable bargain but rather a collusive attempt to
impose an uncompromised full balance of the judgment upon the insurer, the settlement was not binding on the
insurer. (Sargent v. Johnson (8th Cir. 1977) 551 F.2d 221, 232.)
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