Hammering the
Contractor
The
appellate court ruling in Tellis has significantly increased the exposure of contractors to disciplinary
action in disputes with their clients.
The Contractors’ State License Board
(CSLB)—one of the many boards and bureaus of the California Department of Consumer Affairs—licenses, regulates,
and disciplines building contractors. The board’s disciplinary
process consists of various types of actions that may be taken against California contractors who violate their
professional or licensing obligations. Not surprisingly, the
statutes that regulate contractors are often referred to as the Contractors’ License Law.
Pursuant to
those statutes, the CSLB investigates complaints filed against contractors. It is estimated that more than 70 percent of all complaints and their
resulting disciplinary proceedings involve consumer, as opposed to commercial, transactions. Most administrative disciplinary actions do not reach the court of appeal and
thus are not published. Lately, it seems the only actions that are
eventually published are those that benefit the administrative agency rather than the licensee. Recent appellate cases appear to be strengthening, if not actually increasing,
the ability of the CSLB to discipline a contractor. Consequently,
even the most conscientious contractors may find themselves facing the board at some point. Indeed, in Tellis v. Contractors’ State License Board, a case
decided last year, the actual language of the decision, with its far-reaching implications, should
strike fear into the hearts of all contractors.
A major difference between
licensed contractors and many other professional licensees is that contractors may not have the same formal
education and sophistication as their customers. This disparity
frequently leads to misunderstandings and disagreements between contractors and their customers almost from day
one. Thus, it is not hard to imagine how a poorly written contract
containing a vaguely described scope of work can lead to significant disagreements and a consumer complaint—even
against an innocent contractor.
In response to a complaint by
a consumer, the CSLB can issue 1) a warning letter, 2) a citation, or 3) an accusation. The board can also refer a matter for criminal prosecution and, in rare
instances, may seek injunctive relief in superior court or an immediate suspension of a licensee by an interim
suspension order pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act. The
severity of the discipline being sought may be dictated by the staff member handling the
complaint. In many instances, if a contractor is not a repeat
violator and the problem is merely a technical violation, the CSLB will send the contractor a warning
letter. The warning letter may state something as simple as
“your contract does not contain your contractor’s license number.” The letter warns the contractor that further violations will result in
disciplinary action. These warning letters are kept in the
licensee’s file and can be used as an aggravating factor in a future disciplinary
proceeding.
The CSLB also may issue a
citation that requires the contractor to take specified actions.
For example, the board may require the contractor to correct, or pay to correct, a deficiency in the
construction project. It may require the contractor to pay a
penalty ranging from $50 to $2,000, or a citation may require the contractor to take corrective action and pay a
penalty. Although a citation may require the contractor to correct
any deficiencies in its work, a citation often is issued after the owner is disenchanted with the contractor or
after repairs have already been made. In these situations, the
corrective order will require the contractor to pay the owner the amount of the injury as determined by either
the owner or the CSLB’s industry expert. This determination
frequently seems one-sided and hugely excessive compared to the owner’s actual loss.
A citation for a single
construction project cannot assess civil penalties in excess of $2,000; however, a penalty of $15,000 may be
assessed for violations that involve contracting with an unlicensed contractor or aiding and abetting an
unlicensed contractor to evade the law. The civil penalty is in
addition to any correction order: The former constitutes a sanction, while the latter constitutes
restitution.
In the administrative arena,
the charging instrument that seeks the harshest form of discipline is an accusation, which is a more formal
process compared to the much simpler citation procedure. In the
typical accusation proceeding, the administrative agency will seek to suspend or revoke the license it has
issued. The agency may also seek restitution, civil penalties,
attorney’s fees, and the costs of investigation.
Like a civil complaint, an
accusation is a pleading that tells the contractor what he or she has done that violates the law. The contractor can deny the accusation and proceed to an administrative
hearing. Government Code Section 11503 sets forth the parameters of
an accusation:
The accusation shall be a
written statement of charges which shall set forth in ordinary and concise language the acts or omissions with
which the Respondent is charged, to the end that the Respondent will be able to prepare his
defense. It shall specify the statutes and rules which the
Respondent is alleged to have violated, but shall not consist merely of charges phrased in the language of
such statutes and rules.
The failure of the charging
instrument to state grounds for discipline is fatal to the board’s ability to discipline the
licensee. However, the Government Code is very liberal in allowing
amendments to the accusation any time prior to the time the matter is submitted for decision and even allows for
amendment after submission in certain cases.
In addition to civil
disciplinary actions, a contractor may face criminal charges for certain serious violations. Under the criminal statutes that are part of the Contractors’ Licensing Law,
the CSLB can proceed against a licensed contractor or an unlicensed contractor through the criminal
courts. For example, it is a crime to contract without a
license. Using money received for a particular operation or project
for another operation or project not only gives rise to civil discipline but is also a criminal offense under
Penal Code Section 484b. Under Penal Code Section 484c, the
submission of false vouchers to obtain construction loan funds is criminal embezzlement.
Thus, the CSLB may not only
proceed through the attorney general’s office with a civil disciplinary process but may also go to the city
attorney or district attorney and ask for a criminal complaint to be filed. However, criminal charges generally are not sought by the
board. The criminal process is used mainly when a contractor is
a repeat offender or there is substantial injury resulting from the contractor’s misconduct.
In addition to disciplinary
actions, the denial of a license application may lead to the issuance by the board of a “statement of issues”
that will need to be defended by a license applicant. Agencies may
issue this document after the denial of a license when the applicant requests a hearing, or the agency may issue
the denial of a license application in the form of a statement of issues. Hearings contesting a statement of issues are conducted in the same manner as
accusations, though the burden of proof is on the prospective licensee rather than the agency.
Responses and
Proceedings
Probably the most important
step that practitioners must take when contractor clients are served with a citation or accusation is to serve a
responsive pleading—the “notice of defense.” If a contractor is
facing a citation, the contractor may choose to pay the civil penalty and correct, or pay for the correction of,
any deficiencies that are alleged in the citation. In the
alternative, a contractor may seek to appeal all or any portion of the citation. A contractor can do this by checking off boxes on a form that is provided
along with the citation. A contractor may appeal an alleged
violation of the Business and Professions Code section cited in the citation as well as the amount of a civil
penalty and an order of correction.
The contractor only has 15
days from the date of service of the citation to contest it, in writing, by filing the notice of
defense. If the contractor fails to do so, the citation becomes a
final order. Contractors who comply with their citations will have
this fact noted in their records, and no further actions in connection with the citations will
arise. The failure to comply with a citation will result in the
suspension of the contractor’s license until the contractor complies with the citation. If the contractor continues not to comply, the CSLB can revoke the
contractor’s license after the noncompliance has occurred for a requisite time period.
Although it might make
economic sense to simply pay the fine, the truth is that a citation remains on the contractor’s record forever
and can affect the contractor’s prospects for future work.
Therefore, if the contractor has any defenses to a citation, it is usually in a contractor’s interest to fight a
citation rather than simply pay the penalty.
Contractors facing the more
serious accusation process should be aware of the short time available in which to respond. The charging document must be accompanied by notices advising the contractor
of this fact. A failure to respond will result in a waiver of the
right to respond. The charging document also should include a form
response, which is the notice of defense. In addition, the CSLB
usually will send a request for discovery to the contractor along with the accusation. Although an accusation is more formal than a citation, the response to it may
be merely a notice that the contractor intends to present a defense of the charges. The contractor may also object to the accusation, admit the accusation in
whole or in part, or raise affirmative defenses such as the statute of limitations, laches, or constitutional
arguments. The notice of defense must be served within 15 days of
the service of the accusation or the right to a hearing may be waived.
Hearings for contested
citations and accusations are held by an administrative law judge, who sits on behalf of the registrar of
contractors—the executive director of the CSLB. The registrar is
empowered to make all disciplinary decisions on behalf of the board, which
distinguishes the CSLB from other administrative boards that make decisions as a whole. The registrar is the actual judge overseeing the disciplinary proceeding, even
though the registrar is never present at a hearing. The decision of
the administrative law judge is not binding on the registrar. The
registrar can adopt the decision of the administrative law judge in full or in part or refuse to adopt it at
all.
The
Administrative Procedures Act, codified at Government Code Sections 11500 et seq., governs CSLB proceedings.
The hearing before the administrative law judge, while formal, is
less so than civil or criminal court proceedings, and some of the rules of evidence, such as the hearsay rule,
are relaxed. The only available discovery is pursuant to the act
and is limited to the names and addresses of all witnesses, any statements that were taken, investigative
reports, and any documents that would be admissible. One of the
most important differences between the various charging instruments may be the burden of proof at the
administrative hearing. At least one commentator has stated that
the burden of proof for a citation is a preponderance of the evidence. However, if the continued viability of a license is at issue—as in the case of
an accusation that seeks to suspend or revoke a license—the burden of proof on the agency is clear and
convincing evidence to a reasonable certainty because the license has been held to be a vested
right.
Following the
hearing, the administrative law judge will issue a proposed decision. The registrar then may adopt the decision in its entirety or in part, reduce
the penalty proposed, or may depart from the decision and enter his or her own ruling based on the
record. The registrar also can request that additional evidence be
heard. The decision of the judge becomes effective 30 days
following its service unless reconsideration is ordered by the registrar. Reconsideration, however, is rarely granted, although the contractor has 30
days from the service of the decision to request it. The licensee
may seek judicial relief under the Government Code if he or she is unhappy with the decision. The relief is in the form of a petition for a peremptory writ of
administrative mandamus in the superior court. The provisions of
Code of Civil Procedure Section 1094.5 govern such a proceeding, and require the superior court to conduct an
independent review of the administrative law judge’s decision based upon the administrative
record. It is rare for additional evidence to be admitted, and
if a proper record was not made before the administrative law judge, there is really no point in seeking
judicial relief. If either party is displeased with the decision
of the superior court, the matter can proceed to the court of appeal—a lengthy and expensive process that few
contractors are willing to undertake.
While the
CSLB has a wealth of statutes under which it can discipline a licensee, the most typical grounds are conviction
of a felony, fraud, or misrepresentation in obtaining the license, breach of a construction contract,
abandonment of a construction project without lawful excuse, and deviation from acceptable trade standards or
departure from plans and specifications. Contractors are sometimes
also cited or disciplined for violations of the Public Contract Code, aiding and abetting an unlicensed
contractor, or misrepresentation. Business and Professions Code
Section 7110 provides for disciplinary action for what it terms “building laws” or other laws regulating
construction. In the realm of residential construction, the failure
of a contractor to use the proper form and to provide certain notices to the owner is a violation of the
Contractors’ License Law, which can result in discipline. If the
form violation is the only violation, generally the board will issue a warning letter. However, if other violations exist in addition to the form violation, a
citation or accusation may come into play.
The plain
language of some of the more common disciplinary statutes require the board to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that a “willful” violation occurred. For example, Business
and Professions Code Section 7109(b) applies to a “willful departure from or disregard of plans or
specifications”; Business and Professions Code Section 7110 refers to a “willful or deliberate disregard
defense.” If a contractor is facing a citation, the contractor may choose to pay the
civil penalty and correct, or pay for the correction of, any deficiencies that are alleged in the
citation. In the alternative, a contractor may seek to appeal all
or any portion of the citation. A contractor can do this by
checking off boxes on a form that is provided along with the citation. A contractor may appeal an alleged violation of the Business and Professions
Code section cited in the citation as well as the amount of a civil penalty and an order of
correction.
The contractor only has 15
days from the date of service of the citation to contest it, in writing, by filing the notice of
defense. If the contractor fails to do so, the citation becomes a
final order. Contractors who comply with their citations will have
this fact noted in their records, and no further actions in connection with the citations will
arise. The failure to comply with a citation will result in the
suspension of the contractor’s license until the contractor complies with the citation. If the contractor continues not to comply, the CSLB can revoke the
contractor’s license after the noncompliance has occurred for a requisite time period.
Although it might make
economic sense to simply pay the fine, the truth is that a citation remains on the contractor’s record forever
and can affect the contractor’s prospects for future work.
Therefore, if the contractor has any defenses to a citation, it is usually in a contractor’s interest to fight a
citation rather than simply pay the penalty. Contractors facing the
more serious accusation process should be aware of the short time available in which to respond. The charging document must be accompanied by notices advising the contractor
of this fact. A failure to respond will result in a waiver of the
right to respond. The charging document also should include a form
response, which is the notice of defense. In addition, the CSLB
usually will send a request for discovery to the contractor along with the accusation.
Although an accusation is
more formal than a citation, the response to it may be merely a notice that the contractor intends to present a
defense of the charges. The contractor may also object to the
accusation, admit the accusation in whole or in part, or raise affirmative defenses such as the statute of
limitations, laches, or constitutional arguments. The notice of
defense must be served within 15 days of the service of the accusation or the right to a hearing may be
waived. Hearings for contested citations and accusations are held
by an administrative law judge, who sits on behalf of the registrar of contractors—the executive director of the
CSLB. The registrar is empowered to make all disciplinary decisions on behalf of the board, which distinguishes the CSLB from other
administrative boards that make decisions as a whole. The registrar
is the actual judge overseeing the disciplinary proceeding, even though the registrar is never present at a
hearing. The decision of the administrative law judge is not
binding on the registrar. The registrar can adopt the decision of
the administrative law judge in full or in part or refuse to adopt it at all.
The
Administrative Procedures Act, codified at Government Code Sections 11500 et seq., governs CSLB proceedings.
The hearing before the administrative law judge, while formal, is
less so than civil or criminal court proceedings, and some of the rules of evidence, such as the hearsay rule,
are relaxed. The only available discovery is pursuant to the act
and is limited to the names and addresses of all witnesses, any statements that were taken, investigative
reports, and any documents that would be admissible. One of the
most important differences between the various charging instruments may be the burden of proof at the
administrative hearing. At least one commentator has stated that
the burden of proof for a citation is a preponderance of the evidence. However, if the continued viability of a license is at issue—as in the case of
an accusation that seeks to suspend or revoke a license—the burden of proof on the agency is clear and
convincing evidence to a reasonable certainty because the license has been held to be a vested
right.
Following the
hearing, the administrative law judge will issue a proposed decision. The registrar then may adopt the decision in its entirety or in part, reduce
the penalty proposed, or may depart from the decision and enter his or her own ruling based on the
record. The registrar also can request that additional evidence be
heard. The decision of the judge becomes effective 30 days
following its service unless reconsideration is ordered by the registrar. Reconsideration, however, is rarely granted, although the contractor has 30
days from the service of the decision to request it. The licensee
may seek judicial relief under the Government Code if he or she is unhappy with the decision. The relief is in the form of a petition for a peremptory writ of
administrative mandamus in the superior court.
The
provisions of Code of Civil Procedure Section 1094.5 govern such a proceeding, and require the superior court to
conduct an independent review of the administrative law judge’s decision based upon the administrative
record. It is rare for additional evidence to be admitted, and if a
proper record was not made before the administrative law judge, there is really no point in seeking judicial
relief. If either party is displeased with the decision of the
superior court, the matter can proceed to the court of appeal—a lengthy and expensive process that few
contractors are willing to undertake. While the CSLB has a wealth
of statutes under which it can discipline a licensee, the most typical grounds are conviction of a felony,
fraud, or misrepresentation in obtaining the license, breach of a construction contract, abandonment of a
construction project without lawful excuse, and deviation from acceptable trade standards or departure from
plans and specifications.
Contractors
are sometimes also cited or disciplined for violations of the Public Contract Code, aiding and abetting an
unlicensed contractor, or misrepresentation. Business and
Professions Code Section 7110 provides for disciplinary action for what it terms “building laws” or other laws
regulating construction. In the realm of residential construction,
the failure of a contractor to use the proper form and to provide certain notices to the owner is a violation of
the Contractors’ License Law, which can result in discipline. If
the form violation is the only violation, generally the board will issue a warning letter. However, if other violations exist in addition to the form violation, a
citation or accusation may come into play.
The plain
language of some of the more common disciplinary statutes require the board to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that a “willful” violation occurred. For example, Business
and Professions Code Section 7109(b) applies to a “willful departure from or disregard of plans or
specifications”; Business and Professions Code Section 7110 refers to a “willful or deliberate disregard and
violation of the building laws of the state.” Many of the
disciplinary statutes also require that a “material injury” be sustained. For example, a contractor may run afoul of Business and Professions Code
Section 7113 for a “failure in a material respect on the part of a licensee to complete any construction project
or operation for the price stated in the contract”; Business and Professions Code Section 7109(a) covers “a
willful departure in any material respect from accepted trade standards for good and workmanlike
construction.”
Under
charging provisions requiring willfulness, the Contractors’ License Law seems to require the board to prove that
the accused willfully intended to violate the license law or cause the harm; under charging provisions requiring
a material injury, it appears that the materiality of the act or injury must be proven. However, courts have offered conflicting decisions on the meaning of “material
injury” and “willfulness”—and Tellis, the most recent case, wholly departs from many of the prior
contractor discipline cases in addressing these issues.
Materiality
The dispute
in Tellis centered on a contract for the construction of a residence and a request for repairs after the
new homeowners had paid the contractor in full. The owners claimed
they were satisfied at the time they made their final payment. The
owners had given three punch lists (lists of items to be repaired) to the contractor, and these were completed
to the satisfaction of the owners. Thereafter, the owners presented
more items they wanted repaired, and the contractor stated his willingness to do the work. This was before the charging instrument, the citation, was
issued. The citation alleged “significant” errors—allegedly
caused by the contractor—amounting to approximately $5,000 in damages. Unfortunately, no bright-line rule exists for what constitutes
“materiality” or a “material injury,” although Tellis seems to imply that any amount of injury should
be deemed material so long as it is not “trivial.” In
Tellis, the amount of damages allegedly suffered by the owners was only about 2 percent of the
contract price—an amount that in the construction realm could hardly be construed as material to anyone,
including the owners. Given the fact that the contractor had
been trying to work with the owners and the CSLB until a board supervisor stepped in, the Tellis
result seems to be absurd.
The
Tellis court did not address the issue of materiality with regard to the allegations of a departure from
trade standards under Business and Professions Code Section 7109(a). As to the breach of contract allegation under Business and Professions Code
Section 7113, the court, after recognizing that neither the Contractors’ License Law nor any cases define
“material,” dispensed with the issue by stating that the common meaning of the term “material” is
“‘substantial,’ as opposed to trivial.” The court disagreed with
the contractor’s argument that the materiality of the injury or harm should be measured by its proportionality
to the entire performance. If it were, the result would be that on
larger projects, a contractor would be allowed to perform “more substandard work…without a
sanction.” Perhaps the superior court and the court of appeal
held against the contractor because a mere citation was at issue and not a suspension or
revocation. Indeed, the dispute between the parties rested on
the repairing of tiles and did not involve matters of health and safety. Although the Tellis decision is based upon the maxim that a case
should not be overthrown when there is no judicial error by a lower court, its far-reaching language is
troubling.
More than 50
years ago, in the context of a breach of contract dispute, the court in Terminix Company v.
Contractors’ State License Board found that a sufficient settlement offer by a contractor to an owner
prior to the institution of a disciplinary action should preclude a disciplinary action against the contractor.
If the owner had taken the offer, there would be no
injury. This ruling implicates the issue of
materiality. The Terminix reasoning should also apply in
those cases in which a contractor is attempting to make the property owner happy but the owner will not let
the contractor return to the property and make any repairs. One
can argue that if the contractor has tendered performance and that performance has been denied or declined,
Civil Code Section 1485 apparently would excuse further performance. The CSLB, however, would disagree, though that position has not been
adequately tested in the courts.
The
Terminix court held that no charges could be sustained under Business and Professions Code Section 7113
if the owner suffered no prejudice or material injury. While it is
true that the facts in Terminix were that settlements were offered to the owners prior to a full payment
by the owners and before the CSLB brought charges against the contractor, the gist of the case is that the owner
suffered no prejudice or material harm. The Tellis court
cited Terminix and quoted from its holding:
The
Terminix court concluded that completion of the job by Terminix on the terms offered would have amounted
to more than complete performance or restitution, and therefore Terminix was not guilty of any violation:
“Its offer in
good faith, coupled with its admitted ability to complete the work for a fair price, must, under the
circumstances, and for present purposes, be deemed the equivalent of performance.” The Terminix court noted that “[a] contractor cannot be held guilty of
a violation of the act so long as he stands ready, able, and willing to fulfill his contract.”
The
Tellis court relied on the fact that in Terminix the owners had not yet paid the contractor and
held that no violation of Business and Professions Code Section 7113 will be found if during or after
construction but prior to payment the contractor makes any repairs or offers to make repairs. Unfortunately, the Tellis court wrongly examined Terminix and
determined that Terminix only applied when payment in full had not been made. There should be no difference in offering to perform and correct one’s work
either before or after final payment. The contractor in the
Tellis case had no opportunity to correct the alleged deficiencies prior to final payment because there
were no complaints made prior to final payment. Indeed, why should
a final payment be the determining factor when a settlement offer or offer of performance had been made and was
refused?
The
Tellis court also relied on Viking Pools, Inc. v. Maloney, in which the Supreme Court ruled
that the failure to make warranty repairs was tantamount to a breach of contract. There is no doubt that Viking Pools correctly states the
law. In Tellis, however, it appears that at the time the
project was completed in September 1996, the contractor had performed all the warranty work (the punch lists)
that was requested of him. The owners signed a statement that they
were satisfied with the work and paid for the work. Thereafter,
additional problems were found. It appears that Tellis stood ready,
willing, and able to respond to the additional problems.
Tellis thus provides no clear guidance on the issue of what is material, despite seeming to do
so. It is hoped that future courts will construe the relevant
statutes to find that an amount in dispute must be more substantial than 2 percent of the contract price in
order for a disciplinary charge against a contractor to be sustained.
Willfulness
Business and
Professions Code Sections 7109, 7110, and 7116 are the only three sections in the entire contractors’ licensing
scheme that require willfulness. Of these sections, Section 7109 is
the most common basis for allegations by the CSLB:
(a) A willful
departure in any material respect from accepted trade standards for good and workmanlike construction
constitutes a cause for disciplinary action, unless the departure was in accordance with plans and
specifications prepared by or under the direct supervision of an architect. (b) A willful departure from or disregard of plans or specifications in any
material respect, which is prejudicial to another, without the consent of the owner or his or her duly
authorized representative and without the consent of the person entitled to have the particular construction
project or operation completed in accordance with such plans or specifications, constitutes a cause for
disciplinary action.
Commenting on all three
Business and Professions Code sections, the court of appeal in Bailey-Sperber, Inc. v. Yosemite
Insurance Company stated, “We must assume that the difference in statutory phraseology among the sections
indicates a legislative determination to differentiate between conduct not subject to discipline where
inadvertent and that is subject to discipline even [if] inadvertent.” These statutes on their face require a willful violation, but recent cases
have stated that a contractor’s “knowing action” constitutes willfulness. In one case, Mickelson Concrete Company v. Contractors’ State
License Board, work that did not comply with the Uniform Building Code was deemed a willful departure from
trade standards. The court found that the contractor violated
Section 7109 even though prior to doing the substandard work, the contractor informed the owner that the work
was not proper and sought to absolve himself by a written agreement of responsibility for doing the repairs in
the manner requested by the owner. Moreover, the contractor’s
representation that he could repair his prior work with what was stated to be an improper repair, and his
inadequate preparation of the existing work to accept that repair, indicated a purposeful departure from
accepted trade standards that could properly be characterized as willful. Defense practitioners and contractors might validly argue that knowledge alone
does not constitute willfulness. The Tellis court stated
that it need not address this issue because it found that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial
court’s finding that Tellis knew his work was substandard.
The court of appeal stated,
“If more than one rational inference can be deduced from the facts, we may not replace the trial court’s
conclusion with our own.” Indeed, in appeals from administrative
rulings, appellate courts examine whether there was an abuse of discretion because of the lack of substantial
evidence to support the agency’s decision in light of the administrative record. The Tellis court held that the record demonstrated that sufficient
inferences were present to sustain the charges based upon substantial evidence. The court referred to the record—which indicated that Tellis was a
knowledgeable licensed contractor with substantial experience, and documented 17 instances of substandard work
involving significant errors—and stated that an inference could be made that Tellis had knowledge that his work
was substandard.
In Tellis, the
contractor’s poorly done tile work was considered to be a willful deviation from general accepted trade
standards. The contractor had been attempting to work with the
owners and the CSLB to rectify the problem, but the owners were not willing to accept the contractor’s proposed
fix. The contractor argued that the willfulness element of Section
7109 required him to know that his conduct was substandard in order for there to be a finding that he willfully
departed from trade standards in violation of Section 7109. The
CSLB argued that the general intent willfulness standard, as defined in Penal Code Section 7, subdivision 1, was
applicable, which meant that all that was required was the willful act of performing substandard construction;
knowledge of the substandard work was not required. The court
stated that it did not need to rule on the issue of willfulness, though perhaps the court should have done
so. If the court wished to apply the Penal Code statute and obtain
a finding of willfulness under that statute, the burden of proof
for that issue should have been the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. In Tellis, only a preponderance of the evidence needed to be proved (or
arguably, clear and convincing evidence to a reasonable certainty) because a citation was at
issue. Using the Penal Code section thus seems
inappropriate.
While the Business and
Professions Code does not have a definition of “willful,” Insurance Code Section 12340.9 does define “willful”
in a manner that may be more appropriate for use in noncriminal matters:
“Willful” or “willfully” in
relation to an act or omission which constitutes a violation of this chapter means with actual knowledge or
belief that such omission constitutes such violation and with specific intent to commit such
violation. The Tellis court, by allowing an inference of
knowledge, has made the willful element in the Business and Professions Code disciplinary sections
illusory. Following Tellis, if there are merely problems
with a contractor’s work, an inference can be made that they were willfully committed.
Other Grounds for
Discipline
Business and Professions Code
Section 490 allows almost every administrative board and bureau to seek revocation of a license for the
commission of a felony that is “substantially related to the qualifications, functions, and duties of the
licensee.” The Contractors’ License Law, unlike laws governing
other professions, does not allow for discipline solely based upon an act of moral turpitude. Instead, the act must be substantially related to the qualifications,
functions, and duties of contractors. The CSLB, like other
agencies, was required to establish criteria, through regulation, that define the term “substantial
relationship.” The board’s regulation requires proof that the act
evidences to a substantial degree the present or potential unfitness of the licensee to perform the duties of
his or her license. While this issue appears rather clear-cut when
a contractor commits a felony while performing his or her duties as a licensee, the question becomes more
difficult when the licensee performs a felony that at first blush seems unrelated to his or her licensed
activities.
In any disciplinary action,
there are mitigation and aggravation factors. An aggravation factor
could be a prior disciplinary action against the contractor, the action itself, and the contractor’s activities
after the alleged violations were committed. Grounds for mitigation
can consist of efforts by the licensee to mitigate the present action, an unblemished license record showing
years of experience, and other “rehabilitation factors.” Business
and Professions Code Section 482 required the CSLB to adopt criteria for rehabilitation, and these are contained
in Title 16 of the California Code of Regulations. The
administrative law judge is required to apply mitigating and aggravating factors in each proposed decision sent
to the registrar. It would seem that rehabilitation factors must be
applied in any case requiring a substantial relationship analysis.
If the licensee is substantially rehabilitated, then no prior act or crime can evidence to a requisite degree
the present or potential unfitness of the licensee with respect to the qualifications, functions, and duties of
the licensee. A contractor who is rehabilitated is not presently or
potentially unfit. While the disciplinary process for contractors
is similar to what other licensees face, contractors often are less able to properly react to a consumer
complaint. At the same time, the CSLB is burdened with more
complaints than it can properly investigate, so the board may settle for something less than what was
charged.
The most important act that
counsel for a contractor can take to protect his or her client is to respond to a charging instrument promptly
upon its receipt. In addition, affirmative defenses may be raised
even after the filing of a notice of defense or other response. In
evaluating the charges, counsel should look for alleged violations that require
either materiality or willfulness and see whether the facts support such allegations. Finally, practitioners should consider an attempt to distinguish Tellis
by arguing that the applicability of the decision should be limited by the particular facts of the case and,
further, that the appellate court only found that the decision of the trial court was proven by substantial
evidence.
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